The Relational Self

60
3
The Relational Self
Moments from everyday conversation:
“I hope that…”
“I am so angry…”
“What do you think about it…”
“I don’t remember his name…”
“I didn’t intend to…”
“I really want to go…”
“Her attitude is so negative…”
Such phrases are unremarkable, but their consequences in social life
are profound. Consider that whenever we talk we contribute to a relational
process from which the sense of the real and the good are derived. In this
light, consider the way these phrases construct the person. At least one
thing stands out: They all assert the reality of the mind. Declarations of
hope, anger, thought, memory, intention, want, and attitudes all “make
real” mental events. With the help of a dictionary, we could assemble more
than 2,000 such terms…need, fear, doubt, happiness, attitudes, imagination, creativity, ambivalence, and so on. If we consulted an encyclopedia of
psychology, we might even be able to add another 1,000 terms…depression, split imago, flash bulb memory, schema, repression…How stunningly
rich this world is behind our eyes!
•
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The Relational Self 61
The issue here is not simply about words. Rather, our daily lives revolve
around the discourse of the mind. People devote the greater part of their
lives to what they consider their beliefs, their loves, their ideas, their religious
faith, their career aspirations, and so on. In matters of life, death is a close
companion:
• A sense of wounded pride can be an invitation to murder.
• Feelings of hopelessness can invite suicide.
• In a court of law, estimates of intention may make the difference
between freedom and execution.
• A sense of superiority can invite genocide.
It may be safely said that at least in Western culture, life is grounded
in the reality of the mind.
•
Man must know who he is: He must be able to sense himself as both
author and object of his actions. For the only true fulfillment of his
human needs is his development as a fully individuated person,
which recognizes itself as the center of its own being.
—H.M. Ruitenbeek
Being Unbound
The reality of the mind is also the reality of bounded being. Mental states
constitute the very ingredients of the individual interior. One’s ability to
think, and feel, and choose are the very marks of being fully human. Would
a child be normal without the ability to feel pleasure and pain, happiness or
anger? Doesn’t normal development include expanding one’s capacities for
abstract reasoning, conscience, and long-term planning? Could one function
properly in society without having values, attitudes, and opinions? All such
suppositions support and honor the tradition of the bounded self.
•
As I proposed in the initial chapter, the assumption of an internal or mental
world invites alienation, loneliness, distrust, hierarchy, competition, and
self-doubt; favored is a society in which people become commodities and
relationships are devalued. Yet, as proposed in the preceding chapter, this
concept of bounded being finds its origins not within the interior of individual minds, but within co-action. It is from relational process that the
very idea of an “inner world” is created. Speaking of our thoughts, emotions, intentions, and the like is not required by the facts of nature. If we
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62 RELATIONAL BEING
fail to speak in these terms, it is not that we fail to grasp reality. Rather, the
language of the interior issues from a particular tradition of relationship.
By the same token, we can also create together new ways of speaking and
acting. We must not remain forever bound by history.
•
How could we, then, transform the language by which we live; how can we
recognize the primacy of relationship in all that we do? This is the major
challenge of this chapter and the next. My hope is to recast the discourse of
mind in such a way that human connection replaces separation as the fundamental reality. Our understanding of the mental world will be reconstructed in such a way that the wall between inside and outside is removed;
the mental will cease to exist separate from relationship. Then, with this
reformulation in place, Parts II and III of this work will be devoted to
Here we confront two independent beings, spatially and mentally separated. Our
present challenge is to reverse the field of understanding. Rather than focusing on the
independent beings, consider instead the reality of the “between,” that urn-like form
emerging from the co-existence.
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The Relational Self 63
linking concepts to practice. If a conception of relational being is to make
any difference, it must be realized in our lives together.
In this chapter I will first prepare the way by removing the idea of a
distinctly mental world behind the eyes. I will propose that neither I nor
anyone else could know such a world. Our words for mental life are not
maps or mirrors of some interior space. At the same time, such words have
enormous social consequences. Our future may depend on how and when
we use them. Thus, I will propose, what we call thinking, experience,
memory, and creativity are actions in relationship. Even in our private reveries, we are in relationship. In the following chapter I shall take up the
question of the body and emotion.
The Very Idea of Self-Knowledge
In children’s magazines we often find puzzles of the following sort: A
number of words appear in one column, and in an adjoining column we
find an equal number of pictured objects. The child is asked to match the
word with the proper object, “tree” with a picture of a tree, “eagle” with a
picture of an eagle, and so on. Each word refers to a particular kind of
object. Now, as an adult, consider this possibility: Place a dozen words for
mental states in a column, words like “love,” “hope,” “attitude,” and “intention.” In an adjoining column sketch a picture of these various states. When
you have assembled the puzzle…“Hold on….” you say, “you want ‘pictures’
of mental states. What do you mean?” Yes, what could I possibly mean?
What is the color of love, the shape of hope, the size of an attitude, the
contour of an intention? The questions seem nonsensical; they leave us
speechless. But why are they nonsensical? For one, because whatever we
mean by “an inner world,” it is not like the “outer world.” There is nothing
in the “inner world” that allows us to make a picture of it, nothing equivalent to saying, “that is an apple and it is red.” If you close your eyes, and
focus all your attention within, what precisely are you looking at? And if
your eyes are closed, what are you using to do the looking?
•
We often view consciousness as a mirror of the external world. But if
consciousness were to function as a mirror, how could it mirror its own
conditions? Two thousand years of philosophy have yielded no compelling
answers to such questions. Experimental psychologists have long attempted
to disclose the character of the mental world. However, in the 1930s, many
abandoned the idea of “introspective knowledge,” that is, knowledge of the
mind resulting from inner observation. One of the major objections at the
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64 RELATIONAL BEING
time was that the very act of trying to observe one’s experience would alter
the experience.
In his Discourse on Method, René Descartes set out to locate a foundational reality, a solid ground from which he could proceed to understand the
nature of existence.1 Descartes found good reason to doubt the opinion of
authorities, the claims of his peers, and even the evidence conveyed to him
by his senses. Yet, he could not doubt the existence of his own doubting…
the fact that he was thinking. Yet, we must ask, how did Descartes know
that he was thinking? What precisely is “a thought,” that he could be sure
he had one? What is the color, the shape, the size, the diameter, or the
weight of a thought? What if Descartes was simply speaking silently to
himself? Could he have mistaken his use of public speech for private
thought? Could Descartes know he was doubting before he had acquired
the public discourse of doubt?
•
Few ideas are both as weighty and as slippery as the notion of the self.
—Jerrold Seigel
•
Sigmund Freud proposed that the most significant content of the mind—
our fundamental desires, deepest fears, and most unsettling memories—are
hidden from consciousness. This was a momentous proposal, not only
launching the profession of psychiatry, but laying the groundwork for
much therapeutic practice since that time. Most important, Freud informed
Western culture that we cannot know our own minds. What we want most
to know is hidden beneath layers of repression.
Beneath a rational thought lies an unconscious desire.
Beneath professed love we may find hatred.
Beneath a wish to improve the world may lie the desire to destroy it.
Could Freud be right? On what grounds can he be refuted? And yet,
how did Freud know these things? How could he peer into himself, and
recognize what lies beyond consciousness? How did he go about distinguishing between a repression, a desire or a wish? What are the characteristics of these states that he could single them out? And, curiously, how did
Freud manage to remove the barrier of repression to reveal the true nature
of his own desires?
•
1Descartes, R. (2001). Discourse on the method of rightly conducting the reason, and seeking truth
in the sciences. (Original work published in 1637). New York: Bartleby.
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The Relational Self 65
A great many people think they are thinking
when they are merely rearranging their prejudices.
—William James
•
Let me propose that when you…
share your thoughts with me,
tell me you love me,
reveal to me your hopes,
tell me what excites you,
share your fears of the future,
declare that this is your opinion,
tell me that you understand,
report on what you remember,
you are not reporting on the state of a private world. Our words do not
appear to name anything about which we can be certain. As we shall see,
this is not their function.
•
I have pondered these matters for many years, and not without
problems. Early in my marriage, Mary asked that we exchange words
of devotion before winding into sleep at night. To hear “I love you”
would be the reassurance necessary for tranquility. Such a simple
request…and yet I was tormented. How could I be certain of my
mental state…how could I peer inward to know precisely the nature
of my emotions…did emotions exist in the mind or in the body or
somewhere else? I labored nightly for an answer that would allow a
clear declaration. Finally, one night, exhausted by my interminable
philosophizing, Mary intoned, “Just say the words…!” This I was all
too happy to do, and we have slept soundly ever since…
Call in the Experts
If self-knowledge is beyond our grasp as individuals, then how are we
to account for the vast vocabulary of the mind? Why do we have so
many ways of talking about what’s on our mind? Here the critic steps in:
“OK, there are problems with individuals trying to look inside. But is this
our only path to knowledge about psychological states? We have authorities to inform us about such things.” To be sure, religious authorities long
advised us on the nature of our spiritual lives, our desires and fears. In the
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66 RELATIONAL BEING
21st century such authorities have largely been replaced by mental health
professionals. Our 20th century experts of the interior are typically skilled
in interviewing, and may be armed as well with batteries of mental tests.
Can’t we then rely on such experts to inform us about our inner lives?
•
Place yourself for a moment in the chair of the psychiatrist. You listen to
your client, Fred, who says:
“Ever since the death of my father I haven’t felt right. I haven’t been
able to do anything. I just can’t seem to get started. I don’t feel
motivated. Work doesn’t interest me. I don’t know what’s the matter
with me.”
Fred’s words are clear enough. But what are these expressions telling you
about his mental life? Essentially you confront the difficult challenge of
using:
words
the exterior
the surface
the observable
to draw conclusions about:
the mind
the interior
depth
the unobservable.
Now the fun begins. Obviously you have no direct access to what exists
beneath the client’s words (“in his mind”). You can never peer behind the
veil of his eyes. So, how are you to draw conclusions about his inner world,
what truly drives him, what he actually feels, or is trying to say?
•
If you are hesitant in answering how it is you can discern what’s on Fred’s
mind, you are in good company. In fact, the problem of discerning other
minds has challenged some of the West’s most learned scholars for several
centuries.2 It is no less profound than the challenge of trying to understand
2In philosophy the challenge here is often characterized as the “problem of other minds.” See,
for example, Avramides, A. (2001). Other minds. London: Routledge. For more on the problems
of presuming minds within bodies, see Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson;
and Malcolm, N. (1971). The myth of cognitive processes and structures. In T. Mischel (Ed.)
Cognitive development and espistemology. New York: Academic Press.
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The Relational Self 67
God’s intentions from the words of the Bible, knowing what the authors of
the Bill of Rights intended by their pronouncements, deciphering the
underlying meaning of a poem, or trying to understand what a complex
philosophical writing is trying to say. Much may hang on our reaching the
“correct interpretation.” (Indeed, individuals have hung from the gallows
on the basis of others’ interpretations of their words.) For some 300 years
the discipline of hermeneutic studies has been devoted to working out a
plausible rationale for justifying interpretations. Importantly, there is no
commonly accepted solution.3
•
“Yes…but,” the critic responds, “the situation is scarcely hopeless. I do have
history on which I can rely. The thousands of psychiatrists before me have
left a legacy of understanding to guide me; they know what I should be
looking for. In the present case, for example, they might advise me to explore
the client’s feelings of self-esteem, the possibility of repressed anger, or
perhaps a dysfunctional cognitive system.” To be sure, these assumptions
are congenial to the psychiatric community. But, how did this community
come to know about these things? Do we have concepts of “self-esteem,”
“repression,” or “cognitive systems” because the experts of previous generations somehow solved the hermeneutic problem? How did they accomplish
such a feat?
•
A recent headline in the Science and Health section of the Philadelphia
Inquirer:
Sometimes, Bitterness and Irritability are Really Depression.
Is this objective knowledge, divine inspiration, or something else?
•
Again the critic rebuts, “But I can check on my intuitions. I can ask my
client questions bearing on my interpretations, and his answers will suggest
whether I am on the right track or not. I can even share my conclusions
3Hermeneutic studies originated, in large measure, in the attempt to clarify the meaning of
Biblical texts. Hermeneutics is derived from the Greek term for interpreter, and draws from the
image of Hermes in Greek mythology. Hermes conveyed the messages of the gods to mortals, but
was also known for playing tricks. Thus, special skills were essential in determining the true meaning of the messages. The most prominent work in recent hermeneutic study is that of Hans-Georg
Gadamer (1975). Truth and method (eds. C. Barden and J. Cummming). New York: Seabury.
(Original German publication in 1960.) However, Gadamer cannot account for the possibility of
compelling interpretation outside one’s participation in a cultural tradition.
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68 RELATIONAL BEING
with the patient and see if he agrees.” So you suggest to the client that he
may be depressed…and he nods assent. Ah, now you feel you are on the
right track.
But what precisely has taken place here? Has the client considered
your suggestion by turning back into himself and trying to match the term
“depression” against his inner state to see if you might be correct? “Ah, yes,
now I spot a depression running about in here…how could I have missed
that…you are quite correct.” Scarcely!
“Well…” the critic replies, “perhaps the client’s self-knowledge is a bit
shaky. But after all, I don’t have to trust his words alone. I can observe his
conduct—how much he eats or sleeps, how many days he misses work, and
how he spends his leisure hours. His behavior will give me some clues as to
whether he is depressed, or something else. And if I cannot observe these
actions directly, I can rely on carefully developed psychological tests of
depression. On these tests the client can rate how often he “feels tired,”
“has trouble sleeping,” or “has little energy.”4
Fair enough. Don’t we all draw conclusions about people’s inner life
on the basis of their actions? Perhaps we do, but the question we must now
ask is whether we stand on solid ground in such matters? Are people’s
actions truly windows to the mind? Consider: Are bodily actions any different in principle than words in drawing conclusions about what’s on
someone’s mind? In both cases we are using external observables to draw
conclusions about an unseen interior. If I smile, how can you know that it
is an outward expression of happiness, as opposed to satisfaction, ecstasy,
surprise, or bemusement? Could it even be an expression of anger, love,
or giddiness? On what grounds could any of these interpretations be dismissed? Because I tell you so? How would I know? And if I report on a
battery of tests that I often feel tired, or have trouble sleeping and eating,
how could you know these were obvious symptoms of an underlying
depression? After all, where did we come up with the idea that depression
exists in the human mind, by observing it? In effect, our actions—whether
observed or reported on a psychological test—do not speak any more fluently or transparently about mental states than our words.
•
4Tests such as these are now offered by professional services on myriad websites, so that
individuals may learn whether or not they are mentally ill. From the present standpoint, they
learn nothing more than the ungrounded interpretation of a particular group of people. If they
had asked a clergyman, and imam, or a Buddhist for a major interpretation of the same behavior,
“depression” would not be an option.
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The Relational Self 69
Try to determine how long an impression
lasts by means of a stop-watch.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein
•
We confront the conclusion, then, that we have no means of knowing
what’s on someone’s mind, or indeed, whether they possess a “mind” at all.
No matter how many ways in which an individual tells you he is depressed,
and no matter how many relevant actions you take into account, you have
nothing to go on outside a tradition of co-action. You may heap one interpretation upon another to draw a conclusion, but in the end you never
move beyond the web of our own spinning.5
From Mind to Relationship
We now reach a turning point. We have at our disposal thousands of terms
referring to our states of mind; many of our prized institutions are based
on a belief in these mental states; life as we know it would cease to function
if such terms were expunged from our vocabulary. And yet, we find
that there is no way we could have discovered these states by looking
inward; nor do experts have any basis for their claims to know what’s on
our minds. In effect, we have an enormous vocabulary for which there is no
obvious basis. More radically, one might say that mental states are wholly
fictional.
Yet, such a conclusion is not at all a prelude to despair. To presume the
reality of mental states lends itself to all the ills of bounded being described
in Chapter 1. If we believe that human action originates in a mental interior, then the institutions of bounded being are fortified. The individualist
tradition continues unfalteringly. However, if we can suspend the assumption of minds within heads, we enter a clearing in which we can significantly expand the vision of relational being. How are we to proceed? At
the outset I do not believe we should abandon the vocabulary of mental
states. This vocabulary is all too central to the way we live our lives. What
would cultural life be like if we could no longer say things like, “I intend”…
“I think”… “I hope”…“I want”…“I need”…“I love”…and so on?
However, we can refigure our understanding of this vast vocabulary so its
5For further study in the fluidity of interpretation, see Gergen, K. J., Hepburn, A., and
Comer, D. (1986). Hermeneutics of personality description. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 6, 1261–1270.
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70 RELATIONAL BEING
relational basis becomes apparent. We can begin to see that our mental
vocabulary is essentially a vocabulary of relationship. If we can succeed in
such an adventure, we will find that we are not selves apart, but even in our
solitude, profoundly inter-knit.
•
To prepare the way, I wish to put forth four major proposals. If these logics
prove clear and compelling, the way is open to understanding the entire
mental vocabulary as relational in origins and functions. In the remainder
of the chapter we can then take up a range of specific cases, including
reason, intention, experience, memory, and creativity. Thus, the first
proposal:
1. Mental discourse originates in human relationships. What is the
origin of words like thinking, feeling, and wanting? As outlined in
the preceding chapter, the answer lies within the process of co-action. All
words gain their intelligibility—their capacity to communicate—within
coordinated action. Without co-action the noises emitted from the mouth
are little more than sounds; these sounds come into meaning as people
coordinate their actions around them. In this sense, all our terms for mental
life are created within relationships.
•
Children do not first recognize that they think, or feel, or intend, and then
locate a label for these states. Rather, within relationships they acquire a
vocabulary of the mental world that implies the existence of such states.
Parents say, “Oh, I see you are sad,” “you must be very angry,” “can you
remember the time…,” or “You didn’t mean to do it…” without any access
to “what’s in the head” of the child. It is only within their relationships that
sadness, anger, and the like become realities for the child.
•
The critic seeks a word: “As we travel about the world we are scarcely struck
dumb by the actions of people in other cultures. They seem reasonable
enough. And when we interact it seems very clear that people everywhere
are capable of rational thought, possess attitudes, motives, desires, emotions, and the like. There seems to be something equivalent to love everywhere. Isn’t it reasonable to suppose that there are mental universals?” Yes,
superficially this does seem reasonable. But why are we so confident that
there are universals? For example, if:
a Hindu asks, “What is the state of your Atman?
a Japanese asks, “Do you often feel amae?”
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The Relational Self 71
a Chewaong asks “Are you really chan?”
an Ifalukian asks, “Did you feel liget?”
…how are you to reply? After all, would they not believe that people everywhere have these states? There are extraordinary variations across cultures
in what people attribute to the “inner world.” And in some cultures, there
is virtually nothing to be said about mental life.6
•
The critic resists: “Well, people in different cultures may be using different
words, but they may be referring to the same internal states.” This is an
attractive possibility. But what is “the same internal state,” and how would
we ever know whether it is the same? Here we return to the problem of
how we can ever identify states of mind. The translator of words like amae
and chan can never know to what, if anything, in the mind they refer.7 Let
us turn to the second proposal:
2. Mental discourse functions in the service of relationship. If mental
language is not a reflection of inner states, why do we use it at all? We are
guided to an answer by the preceding discussion on origins. That is, if
mental language emerges from social relationships, then we can trace its
utility to the same sphere. Let us not ask what it refers to in the head, but
how it functions within our relationships. Consider:
When we say, “please come for a visit,” “look at that sunset!” or “Is that
the number 9 bus?” there are social consequences. The result of saying
such things is that people board planes, cast their gaze into the distance,
or give us information. In short, the words have a pragmatic function. Does
mental language not function in just this way? When someone says, “You
make me so angry,” or “You make me so happy,” something is expected of
you. Bursts of anger are typically used to correct your behavior or bring you
in line; expressions of happiness will invite you to repeat what you have
done.

The Phrase: “I am so sad” “I am disappointed in you”

Invites: Comforting Questioning

AssignmentTutorOnline

6For more on cultural variations in the construction of the mind, see Lutz, C. A. (1988).
Unnatural emotions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Rosaldo, M. (1980). Knowledge and
passion: Illongot notions of self and social life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Russel, J. A.
et al. (1995). Everyday conceptions of emotion: An introduction to the psychology, anthropology and
linguistics of emotion. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
7I will take up the question of how successful translations are achieved in the next chapter.
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72 RELATIONAL BEING

“These are my beliefs.” “I need your attention.” “I feel bad about what happened.” “This is depressing.”

Respect Curiosity Forgiveness Commiseration

•
There is something which is at the moment of uttering
being done by the person uttering.
—J.L. Austin
•
While this much seems clear, there are dangers lurking. Consider for a
moment two lovers. Each uses special expressions of love, and the consequences of using them are mutually congenial. However, let us not conclude that they use these words in order to bring about the consequences.
To say that mental language has social consequences is not to say that we
are always using language strategically to gain our ends. To draw this conclusion would collapse the relational view unfolding here into “social life as
manipulation.” This view of persons as dramatic actors, perennially popular in the social sciences, has just such implications.8 Words of love, from
this perspective, are necessarily inauthentic, used for purposes of stroking
one’s ego or “getting laid.” This is not what is being proposed here. One
could only draw such a conclusion if it were possible to identify people’s
intentions—their “inner reasons” for acting. How could one act on his or
her intentions if they couldn’t be recognized? Yet, it is this very problem of
knowing one’s interior that we found insoluble. Thus, is a man who seems
bent on seducing every woman in sight, trying to compensate for a deep
insecurity, share the joys of sensuality, retaliate against bourgeois conventionality, or something else? And how could he know? How could he look
inward to identify which impulse was indeed in motion? As we have seen,
there is little means of doing so. If we cannot identify our motives, then we
cannot consciously treat others as means to our own ends. Let us abandon
this dismal view of social life. We turn to the third proposition:
3. Mental discourse is action within relationships. Consider again the
social uses of mental discourse. In doing so, we also realize that mental
discourse is itself a form of action within a relationship.9 Return to
8Erving Goffman’s dramaturgic view of social life is often held to exemplify this view. See
Goffman, E. (1956). The presentation of self in everyday life. New York: Doubleday.
9This view is foreshadowed in Roy Schafer’s 1976 volume, A new language for psychoanalysis
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), in which he advocates replacing all mental terms from
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The Relational Self 73
our lovers. They each have their special words of endearment. But these
words are not simply hovering overhead in a comic strip balloon. Their
words are actions within a relationship, and in this sense, equivalent to the
remainder of the body in motion—lips, eye movements, gestures, posture,
and so on. The spoken language is but one component of a full social
performance. Our words are notes within orchestrated patterns of action.
Without the full coordination of words and action, relational life turns
strange.
•
Consider the consequences if one of our erstwhile lovers, utters words of
endearment while:
pressing his thumb to his nose.
thrusting his little fingers in his mouth.
leaning over to peer through his legs.
adopting the posture of a javelin thrower.
raising the middle finger of his hand and thrusting it forward.
The words of endearment now become components of farce, insult, or
nonsense.
•
We may speak of these full coordinations as relational performances, that is,
actions with or for others. The performances in this case include the discourse of the mind.10 In calling them performances attention is directed to
their socially crafted character. For example, when you tell someone “I was
thinking that…” you are not likely to be screaming or writhing on the
ground. Rather, your tone of voice will probably be measured and your
gestures minimal. When you say, “I am angry,” you are not likely to be
grinning or hopping on one foot. You are far more likely to speak with lips
tightened and possibly with clenched fists. In effect, “thought” and “anger”
are not inside, searching for release in expression. They are fully coordinated bodily performances in which the words, “thinking” and “anger”
often (but not necessarily) figure. We perform thinking and anger in the
nouns to verbs. Thus we would not be inclined to view memory, for example, as a thing or a place,
but as an action (as in remembering).
10I am indebted here to James Averill’s account of emotions as cultural performances.
See Averill, J. R. (1982). Anger and aggression: An essay on emotion. New York: Springer Verlag;
Averill, J. R., and Sundarajan, L. (2004). Hope as rhetoric: Cultural narratives of wishing and
coping. In J. Eliott (Ed.) Interdisciplinary perspectives on hope. New York: Nova Science; and
Edwards, D., and Potter, J. (1992). Discursive psychology. London: Sage.
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74 RELATIONAL BEING
same sense that we might kick a ball or drive a car. “Thinking,” “feeling
anger,” “kicking,” and “driving” are all intelligible actions; it is simply that
the first two carry with them words drawn from a vocabulary of mind.11
•
Perceptions, thoughts and feelings…are parts of practical activity.
—Michael Westerman
4. Discursive action is embedded in traditions of co-action. Thus far
we have focused solely on the performer. However, it is essential that we
draw attention once again to the process of co-action. In this context it is
clear that the meaning of the performance is not the possession of the actor
alone. Its meaning is born in the coordination. To illustrate, Ron has
professed his love for Cindy in a beautifully coordinated way: words,
gestures, tone of voice, gaze…an incandescent expression of devotion.
Or is it? From the standpoint of co-action, another’s supplement will ratify
it as meaning one thing as opposed to another. Thus, in spite of Ron’s
creditable performance, its fate now lies in Cindy’s hands. She may respond,
“Oh Ron, I think I am in love with you too,” thus identifying Ron’s actions
as expressions of love.
However, consider some alternative possibilities:
– Oh Ron, you are like a dependent child.
– You haven’t a clue what you’re talking about.
– Yea…but you said that last week to Sue.
It is also important to consider here that Cindy doesn’t have complete
freedom in responding to Ron. While each of these replies is sensible in
Western culture, it would not be intelligible for Cindy to crow like a
rooster, or respond by asking Ron if he has any popcorn. We are immersed
in conventions of coordination, and to remove oneself from such conventions altogether is to cease making sense.12 Ultimately we must consider
these traditions of co-action within the broader contexts of which they are
part. As Kenneth Burke reasoned, actions gain their intelligibility from the
11The metaphor of the performance is useful in calling attention to the fully embodied and
social character of action. However, for some it may carry connotations of dissemblance or masking, or entertainment. For present purposes these are unfortunate and irrelevant traces.
12As Jan Smedslund proposes, in the same way that grammatical conventions govern most
intelligible speech, so are there conventions that govern virtually all that we can intelligibly say
about the mental events. See Smedslund, J. (1988). Psycho-logic. New York: Springer-Verlag; and
Smedslund, J. (2004). Dialogues about a new psychology. Chagrin Falls, OH: Taos Institute
Publications.
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The Relational Self 75
scene in which they occur.13 The scene will include, for example, the physical location of the action. An expression of love shouted to one’s companion at a rock concert would not generally carry the same weight as if uttered
in bed after intercourse. The former could be written off as “mere exuberance;” in the latter case the moment of exuberance has passed. The relational performance occurs within a confluence that gives it legitimacy.
Here we have four proposals, first, that mental discourse originates in
relationships; second, that the function of such discourse is social in nature;
third, that its expression is a culturally prescribed performance; and finally,
that such performances are embedded within traditions of co-action. To
have a mental life is to participate in a relational life. With these proposals
in place we are positioned for a full reconstruction of the psychological
world.
13Burke, K. (1952). A grammar of motives. New York: Prentice Hall.
Courtesy: The New Yorker Collection 2002 and Leo Cullum from the cartoonbank.
com All Rights Reserved.
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76 RELATIONAL BEING
Mind as Action in Relationship
The proposals for mind as relational performance are as questionable as
they are challenging. It is essential now to fill out the emerging picture, to
explore the potentials and possible shortcomings as we take up more specific cases. Let us shift the focus, then, to the specific processes of reason,
intention, experience, memory, and creativity. In what sense are these relational actions? I begin with these specific cases not only because talk about
such processes plays such an important role in everyday life, but because
they also seem so obviously “in the head.” How can they be relocated in the
region of the “between?” In the following chapter we can then take up
mental states that are often viewed as biological, specifically the emotions,
along with states of pleasure and pain.
Reason as Relationship
If I asked you about your thoughts on current politics, the national debt,
or abortion rights, almost invariably you would answer with words. You
would not likely flap your arms, jump up and down, or flex your muscles.
When someone asks about thoughts, they typically anticipate words in reply.
One reason we anticipate words, is because of the longstanding assumption
in Western culture that words are the carriers of thought. As we often say
today, “these words don’t adequately express my ideas,” or “can you express
your thoughts more clearly?”14 It is this view I have attempted to discredit in
preceding sections. Let us consider reason, then, as a social performance.
•
If good reasoning is a performance within a social tradition, we may then
ask about the character of a well-formed performance. In the same way we
can ask about whether a given actor performed Hamlet in a convincing
way, we can ask about the qualities of effectively performing reason. As a
first approximation, all of the following phrases could be candidates for a
good performance of reason:
It is my studied opinion that…
The superior strategy would be…
I have considered both sides of the issue…
14This conception of language has a long history, traced at least to Aristotle. Today it generates lively debate among scholars on the relationship between language and thought. Does language affect our thinking, it is often asked. Such debate is largely premised on the dualistic view of
mind that the present account throws in question.
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The Relational Self 77
Yet, what if we completed the sentences in the following way:
It is my studied opinion that we are descendents of frogs.
The superior strategy would be to visit Hell.
I have considered both sides of the issue, and am utterly confused.
As we find, sentences that begin to approximate good reasoning at the
outset, turn strange as words are added to the sentence. Never do we have
access to a “reasoning process within,” but only to the shifting arrangements of words. It is the arrangement of words that we are judging, and not
a mind off stage. We are not compelled or convinced by good thinking, but
good words. Good reasoning and good rhetoric walk hand in hand?15
•
Although we may have the feeling that we do our cognitive work in
isolation, we do our most important intellectual work as connected
members of cultural networks.
—Merlin Donald
•
Yet, we must not make the mistake of attributing to the words alone the
properties of “good” and “bad reasoning.” We must again consider the
tradition of relationship in which the performance is embedded. Another’s
words do not become “good thinking” until there is co-action, until we as
listeners credit them as such. What we consider good reasoning…
– in economic circles is to speak in terms of maximizing economic
gain and minimizing losses.
– in romanticist enclaves is to rebel against the logic of economic gain.
– in materialist camps is to honor decisions that contribute to physical
well-being.
– in spiritualist groups is to invite the transcending of bodily pleasure.
•
This is to say that all utterances can be rationale within some relationship.
Here I am drawn to Jerzy Kosinski’s novel and award winning film, Being
There. The major protagonist, Chauncey, is a simple-minded gardener
whose scant utterances are limited to phrases he has acquired from gardening and television. Yet, within these phrases others find enormous wisdom,
enough that they consider Chauncey a viable candidate for President.
15Also see, Billig, M. (1996). Arguing and thinking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
and Myerson, G. (1994). Rhetoric, reason and society. London: Sage.
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78 RELATIONAL BEING
Of course, this is the stuff of fiction. Or is it? Consider the number of social
movements that have spawned totally convincing reasons for suicide,
torture, and genocide.
•
I have as many sound thoughts as there are
communities in which I participate.
•
The critic remains unsatisfied, “OK, whether I am considered rational or
not may depend on social convention, but even then, when I am writing or
speaking it is I who produce the words. And, when it is very important to
me, I silently deliberate. I take time to consider what I am writing to a
grieving friend, or what I will say to my son who thinks he might be gay.
This is not a public performance; it is taking place inside of me. And the
word ‘thinking’ is a good way of referring to it. Otherwise, what sense
would there be in the advice to ‘think before you speak?’”
Indeed, this is a fruitful line of argument, and helps to flesh out the
view of social performance. There are two important issues. First, it is
important to recognize that what the critic is calling private thinking is not
cut away from social life. For example, to privately formulate or solve a
mathematical problem is to participate in a social tradition. In psychology
this line of argument was introduced by Lev Vygotsky,16 and is represented
today in a substantial line of scholarship on the cultural basis of thought.17
In Vygotsky’s famous lines, “There is nothing in mind that is not first of all
in society.”18 Thus, for example, what we call thinking is a private rendition
of public conversation. How else could it be? If I asked you to think about
the political situation, the national debt, or abortion rights, and you had
never heard any of these words, what would thinking consist of?19
There is a second significant issue. Why must we conclude that quiet
deliberation is “inside” the person? This would reinstate the dualist premise
of a mind behind the words. Rather, let us consider this “something” we do
16Vygotsky, L.S. (1978). Mind in society. (M. Cole, Trans.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
17See, for example, Cole, M. (1998). Cultural psychology: A once and future discipline. Cambridge:
Belknap Press; Wertsch, J. J.V. (1991). Voices of the mind: A sociocultural approach to mediated
action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Bruner, J. (1990). Acts of meaning: Four lectures on
mind and culture. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
18Vygotsky, op cit. p. 142.
19It is largely this argument—that one cannot engage in private thinking without participation
in a community—that has led communitarians to reject liberal individualism. See, for example,
Sandel, M. (1988). Liberalism and the limits of justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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The Relational Self 79
alone as itself a relational performance. It is neither “in here” nor “out there.”
It is an embodied performance, but in this case, without an immediate audience or full expression. Michael Billig points in this direction when he asks
us to consider thinking as a “silent argument.”20 In effect, it is a social performance on a minimal scale. Instead of uttering the words out loud to
another, one utters them to an implied audience and without sound. In the
same way an actor may rehearse his lines silently, or one may hum to herself.
What we do privately is not taking place in an “inner world”—called
mind—but is to participate in social life without the audience present.
Implicitly there is always an audience for our private reveries. Private deliberation is, then, a partial performance, a topic to which we shall return.
•
In solitude we never stop communicating with our fellowmen.
—Tzvetan Todorov
Agency: Intention as Action
Precious to Western culture is the vision of the individual as a free but
ultimately responsible agent. We prize our capacity to choose, to direct our
actions according to our decisions. And by holding people responsible for
their actions, we feel the grounds are established for a moral society. The
idea of an inner wellspring of action can be traced to Aristotle. As he saw it,
there is an active force within the person responsible for bodily animation.
To this force he assigned the concept of what can be translated as “soul.”
The soul possesses the “power of producing both movement and rest.”21
As the concept evolved over later centuries, it was incorporated into
the Christian tradition. To commit a sin, within this tradition, is to act
voluntarily, thus bringing the soul into a state of impurity. With the
Enlightenment, this view became secularized. Instead of the soul, we came
to speak of conscious intent, and what had been a sin became a crime. The
State replaced the Church as the arbiter of intent. One can only engage in
a criminal act intentionally, that is, as an exercise of voluntary or conscious
agency. In large measure we can thus trace the contemporary value placed
on “free will” to the Christian tradition and the significance it placed
on the soul as the center of being. Given the social origins of the concept,
let us explore the discourse of agency as relational action:
•
20 Billig, op cit. p. 5
21Aristotle (1951). Psychology (p. 127) (P. Wheelwright, Trans.) New York: Odyssey Press.
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80 RELATIONAL BEING
First it is clear that although the mind is opaque, the discourse of agency is
both significant and pervasive. We commonly say, for example:
I intend to be there.
What is she trying to do?
I choose this alternative.
What are your intentions, sir?
I meant no harm.
My purpose in being here is…
I aim to please.
It is also clear from earlier discussion that when we utter such phrases we
are not giving a report on an inner state of mind. For example, what is the
intention of a man who is simultaneously driving his car, going to Chicago,
returning his mother-in-law to her home, enjoying the passing scenery,
talking with his mother-in-law about family matters, and fulfilling his
image of a good husband? Does this man intend only one of these actions,
all of them simultaneously, each of them for a quarter of a second, or something else…? How would he go about answering such questions? What
part of his mind would he examine?22
•
There need not be a “doer behind the deed.”
—Judith Butler
•
Abandoning the presumption of intentions as “in the head,” it is useful to
consider the way the discourse of intentions functions in daily life. As we use
this language, there are consequences:
“I didn’t intend to hurt you.” reduces the likelihood of blame.
“What I meant to say is…” is the prelude to a clarification.
“He has the best of intentions.” assigns credit to the individual.
“He means well.” serves as a form of mild derision.
“I mean what I say.” tells us to take this seriously.
The language of intentions is central to our forms of cultural life.
This is indeed the same conclusion reached by many social scientists.
As reasoned here, we are often asked or required to explain our actions.
Why did we act in some strange way; why did we draw such an unusual
conclusion; why do we prefer this as opposed to that? We respond by giving
22Here I am indebted to G. E. M. Anscombe’s 1957 book, Intention. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
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The Relational Self 81
what social scientists call accounts. We are primarily called into account
when there are failures or undesirable deviations of some kind. “How could
you possibly have decided to….?” Such accounts are crucial to how we
are treated. Depending on the account, we may be forgiven, and possibly
honored; on the other hand we may be imprisoned.23
•
The critic grows impatient: “Surely you can’t be serious. If I rammed my
car into a telephone pole, I would very well know whether I intended to or
not. If I were to spill my hot coffee into your lap, I would be absolutely
certain that I didn’t mean to. When a court of law tries to distinguish
between murder and manslaughter (where the death was unintended), not
just any account will do.” The critic does have a point. We do make these
distinctions between intentional and accidental actions, and most of
the time we are pretty certain about what our intentions are in a given
situation. The question, then, is how can we reconcile the fact that we can,
at times, readily identify our intentions, with the proposal for intention as
relational performance?
To reply, consider again what we are doing when we “recognize our
intentions.” As we have seen, it is nonsense to suppose that we can look
inside our mind to locate the intention. But we can draw from traditions
of co-action in recognizing our actions. When I am standing before a class
I am engaged in a performance we traditionally call teaching. The students
recognize this performance as teaching no less than I. How, then, do I
know what I am trying (intending, attempting, endeavoring) to do in this
situation? It is evident to me not from looking inward but from simply
identifying the performance. Without hesitation I can tell you that I am
trying to teach or intending to teach because I am engaged in the commonly recognizable performance of teaching. I could scarcely tell you
that what I am really trying to do is cook an egg or plant tulip bulbs.
I recognize my intentions in the same way an actor recognizes he is playing
the part of Hamlet and not Othello. To name my intentions is to name the
performance in which I am engaged.
•
23Shotter, J. (1984). Social accountability and Selfhood. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Accounts may also be used to sustain communication flows (Buttny, R. (1993). Social accountability in communication. London: Sage); modulate blame (Semin, G. R., and Manstead, A. S. (1984).
The accountability of conduct. London: Academic Press), and reduce conflict (Sitkin, S. B., and Bies, R. J.
(1993). Social accounts in conflict situation: Using explanations to manage conflict. Human
Relations, 46, 349–370.)
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82 RELATIONAL BEING
Let us consider the question of duplicity in this light. As the critic might
say, “ If you cannot look inward to know your intentions, as argued, how
could you lie about them? For example, how could you know if you
intended to commit a crime or not?” The answer is because we recognize
the performances in which we are engaged. Thus, if I recognize myself to
be hunting wild boar, and the bullet strikes another hunter, I can genuinely
say, “I didn’t mean to.” If I recognize my actions as spying for my country,
and I tell my landlady that I am studying archeology, I can know that I am
lying about my intentions. We are publicly labeling our actions in one way,
while simultaneously suppressing an alternative definition.
•
My actions leap forward, carrying my reasons in tow.
•
The critic laments: “OK, but if you redefine agency as social performance,
aren’t you playing into the hands of the determinists, those who would
dispense with the idea of free will? The renowned psychologist, B.F Skinner,
argued that the idea of voluntary agency was not only a myth, but a harmful one at that. Social psychologists even go so far as to say that claims to
voluntary choice constitute a ‘fundamental attribution error.’ The result of
such views is a dehumanization of the person, the removal of the central
ingredient of human worth, and one that separates us from machines.
People become objects, just like other objects, of no particular value. Nor
can we hold anyone responsible for his or her actions. To give the world to
the determinists would be an enormous cultural loss.”
I do appreciate the force of this argument, and share in strong reservations about the determinist project in the social sciences. However, following the logic of co-action, we must first recognize that both the concepts
of free will and determinism are the outcome of people talking together.
As I proposed in the preceding chapter, debates over free will and determinism are not about what is more justifiably or “truly” the case, but
between two traditions of talking and their related forms of life. The primary question we must address is what happens to our lives when we
embrace these forms of understanding? There are certain outcomes we
might value in both cases. But as I have argued in the present work, both
these concepts create a world of fundamental separation. The attempt in
this case is to reconfigure agency in such a way that we move beyond the
voluntarism/determinism debate, and bring relationship into the center of
our concerns. By viewing agency as an action within relationship, we move
in exactly this direction.
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The Relational Self 83
Experience and Memory: Not Mine but Ours
What is more fundamental than the fact that each of us lives in a world
of our own experience? I live in my subjective world, and you in yours.
And, from these daily experiences we develop a storehouse of memories.
Memory, in the common tradition, is largely the accumulation of experiences. In what sense, then, can we understand experience and memory as
relational phenomena, belonging not to each of us privately but to us collectively? Let us first consider experience, and then turn to its offspring,
memory.
•
I begin with a story related to me by a foreign aid worker. Tim was
trying to help farmers in a poor region of Africa accept new and
more productive methods of crop growth. To get the message across,
he and his colleagues used a film to demonstrate the optimal way of
planting and harvesting. After the film was shown to a group of poor
farmers, the aid workers asked them to talk about what they had
seen. A farmer quickly spoke out, “The chicken, the chicken…”
The audience roared their affirmation. The aid workers were
dumbfounded. This was not a film about a chicken, but methods of
farming. There was no chicken in the film. The audience insisted
there was. So the aid workers replayed the film, and to their great
surprise, in a significant segment of the film, a chicken was
wandering about in what for them was the background.
•
For experimental psychologists such differences in our experiences of
the world are understood in terms of attention. The aid workers and the
farmers were attending to different aspects of the film. So central to human
functioning is attention, that its study is one of the oldest traditions in
psychology.24 The most important fact about attention is the way in which
it fashions what we take to be the world before us. Automobile drivers
know this very well. With eyes on the road one scarcely appreciates the
passing environment; and so commanding is the shift of attention to the cell
phone that it is perilous. Perhaps the most vivid demonstrations in the
experimental laboratory are secured by means of dichotic listening devices.
24For example, James Sully’s 1892 volume, Outlines of psychology (New York: Appleton), designates attention as an “elementary” dimension of the mind, and devotes almost 20 pages to its
functioning.
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84 RELATIONAL BEING
Participants experience different messages delivered by earphones to each
ear. Such studies consistently demonstrate that the ability to understand
what is presented in one ear is reduced by what is received in the other.
If successful in comprehending the incoming information in one ear,
people are virtually insensitive to what is heard in the opposing ear. Even if
the language in the second ear is is an unknown language, participants are
virtually unaware. One might say that seeing does not precede believing;
believing is a prelude to seeing.
If our experience is largely dominated by the direction of our attention, we must then ask, why does attention move in one direction as
opposed to another? The most obvious answer to this question lies in the
realm of relationship. It is through co-action that the realities of the world
become significant. Some value chickens and others methods of planting.
The mother coordinates her actions with the infant’s so as to secure its gaze
on the teddy bear as opposed to the floor; the teacher demands that students attend to her as opposed to their cell phones; extended gazing into
each other’s eyes is reserved for lovers; and should we cease attending to our
partners in conversation we are soon scorned. To whom, when, and where
we direct our attention is no less constrained by social tradition than public
speaking.
•
When peering into the microscope,
the biologist doesn’t see the same world we do.
—Norwood Russell Hanson
•
I have long been fascinated by a classic research study in social
psychology in which investigators were interested in students’
perceptions of a football game between Princeton and Dartmouth.
The game was an especially rough one, with significant injuries on
both sides. Yet, when queried about the game, 85% of the Princeton
students said that Dartmouth had started the rough play, while only
36% of the Dartmouth students believed this was so. More
dramatically, when shown a film of the game a week later, the
Princeton students observed the Dartmouth team made over twice as
many rule infractions as were seen by Dartmouth students. As the
authors conclude, “…there is no such ‘thing’ as a ‘game’ existing
‘out there’ in its own right which people merely ‘observe.’
The game ‘exists’ for a person and is experienced by him only
insofar as certain happenings have significance in terms of his
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The Relational Self 85
purpose.”25 Of course, “his purpose” in this case was highly
dependent on school affiliation.
The critic is puzzled: “Are you trying to say that we just see what we want
to see? What if a truck has lost control and headed your way, and your
desire is not to be crushed? Then, are you saying, you simply wouldn’t
see the truck? This seems absurd.” Of course it’s absurd. But this is not
quite what is being said here. As I pointed out in the preceding chapter,
25Hastorf, A. H., and Cantrill, H. (1954). They saw a game: A case study. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 1, 129–134.
The stereogram demonstrates the way in which our visual experience depends on the
relationships of which we are a part. In following instructions on how to gaze at a
stereogram—replacing the tendency to focus on the target of vision with an open and
non-directed gaze—one enters into new visual worlds. The reader is invited here to
view Gary Priester’s stereogram, Walk In-Dance-Out, in such a way that the three
figures are joined by friends.
Courtesy: Gary W. Priester
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86 RELATIONAL BEING
it is not that nothing exists before relationship. It’s that nothing exists
for us. We live in a world where trucks out of control are very important
events; we place a value on not being crushed. Thus, this event is filled with
meaning for us. But let’s take a more subtle case. If a 4-year-old sees an
open bottle of Coca Cola sitting beside the road, his eyes may brighten,
and he may very well pick it up and drink the contents. The experience is
a positive one. As adults most of us would not only see the bottle as “litter,”
but also respond negatively. And almost never would we consider drinking
from the bottle. We have co-created a world in which unseen bacteria are
highly significant. Even that which is not present to the human eye has
meaning for us. Outside of any form of convention, there would be little
to capture our attention.
•
One must know before one can see.
—Ludwig Fleck
•
If experience is a form of relational action, what then are we to make of
memory? Traditionally we treat memory as a private event. My memories
are distinctly mine, we say, they live within me alone. So, let me here recall
a personally humiliating experience:
As 6-year-olds, my friend Wilfred and I were allowed to take the bus
to town. When we were crossing the street, however, Wilfred was
struck by a car. A large crowd gathered; I was shoved aside. Soon an
ambulance arrived, and whisked my friend away. I was stunned by
the event; my head was swimming, and with the crush of the crowd,
I was unable to reach the ambulance before it set off. When I arrived
home an hour later, I blurted the story to my parents in a torrent of
tears; and I could tell them nothing of Wilfred’s welfare and
whereabouts. My parents ultimately found answers to these
questions, locating Wilfred at a local hospital and learning that he
had only fractured his leg. I was left, however, with a lifelong feeling
of ineptitude.
Now, on the face of it, this memory is very much my own. No one else
owns this story in the way I do. However, let us explore further. My attention
in this instance fastened on the accident and ambulance; a turbulent drama
was unfolding. But I could have directed it elsewhere. I could have examined
the shoes of the assembled crowd, the racial mixture, the facial expressions,
the age variations, the weather, and so on. Yet, none of these were interesting
to me or to the bystanders. Our attention was communally riveted. This is
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The Relational Self 87
because within our culture we have come to share practices of attending.
And these practices are intimately connected to our shared values, in this
case the injury or possible death of a boy. In effect, my experience was mine
in only a limited way. The sense organs of my body were in action; my
body was in a unique position compared to others. However, the character
of my experience was fully saturated with my relationship to Wilfred and
to the culture more generally.
•
Let us turn from the origins of memory to its ultimate expression in words.
In the story of Wilfred, there were many witnesses, each standing in a
different place and coming from a different background. However, if they
got together and talked, they would typically try to reach consensus on
“what happened.” Was it Wilfred’s fault; was the driver careless; who called
the ambulance; was Wilfred badly hurt? From this process of co-action
will likely emerge a commonly compelling version of “what happened.” For
them, this account will seem “true” or “factual.” This social dimension of
memory has indeed stimulated the interest of many scholars over the years.
The early work of Frederick Bartlett in England and Maurice Halbwalchs
in France opened the way to understanding memory as a social process.26
As Bartlett characterized it, memory is not so much a recording of sense data
in the brain, as “an effort after meaning.” Echoing this view, scholars from
history, psychology, and sociology currently explore the process of what
is variously labeled “communal,” “collective,” or “social memory.”27 Much
of this literature demonstrates the ways in which “what happened” as a
matter of social negotiation. Through the process of co-action, we construct
“how we fell in love,” “our vacation,” or “the last family reunion.” We also
construct history—of “great men,” nations, and peoples.
•
Common memories not only stabilize our worlds, but our social
bonds. I am often struck by the urgency of couples to “get their story
straight.” I have seen couples ignite in irritation when they disagree
on “what happened to us.” To disagree is to exit the world of “with.”
Both my stability and my bonds were threatened by an incident with
26See Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental social psychology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; Halbwachs, M. (1925). Les cadres sociaux de la memoire. Paris: Albin.
27An excellent discussion of this work is contained in Middleton, D., and Brown, S. D.
(2005). The social psychology of experience. London: Sage. Also see Connorton, P. (1987). How societies remember. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Misztal, B. A. (2003). Theories of social
remembering. Buckingham: Open University Press; Wertsch, J. V. (2002). Voices of collective
remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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88 RELATIONAL BEING
my mother. I had lived my adult years telling my children a story
from my childhood, when at the age of three I wandered off from
home in Cambridge. My parents were in agony, and only later did
the police find me and restore me to their eager arms. I seemed far
more concerned, however, with the fact that I had lost my shoe.
Later, when my mother became a grandmother to my children,
I listened as she began to tell them the same story. However, this
time I reacted with disoriented dismay. The story being told was not
about me, but my older brother, John! When a family member
abandons the zone of common memory, he or she also removes the
foundations from the house of being.
•
It is not simply that reports of memory are continuously created through
co-action. There are also social conventions for what counts as a proper
performance of memory, and when and where the performance is appropriate. To appreciate the point, consider a court of law: Several months
prior to a trial you witnessed certain events and must now testify before the
jury. In response to the lawyer’s question about what you saw that evening,
you reply black…window…light… crash… running… trees… The lawyer
looks quizzically, and admonishes you, “No that won’t do. I need you to
tell the jury what happened.” You reply, “I just did; that’s what happened!”
The lawyer might well be dumbfounded, and ask you to step down; you
might even be held in contempt of court. Why? Because you did not tell a
well-formed story or narrative. You would be acknowledged as “remembering,” if you had replied: “The night was pitch black, but as I looked out my
window I saw the lights of a speeding car; it careened off the side of the
road and hit a parked van, at which point the driver quickly ran into the
trees.” This latter account is structured as a traditional narrative. There is a
beginning and ending, there is a significant event (the crash); all the additional elements of the story are related to this event; the elements are
arranged in chronological order. Such rules for telling a good story long
pre-dated your appearance in court. Regardless of what happened, it only
becomes a ratified memory if it conforms to the rules. And so it is with
what we take to be the story of our lives, the history of our nation, or the
evolution of the human species.28
28For autobiography as narrative, see MacIntyre, A. (1984). After virtue: A study in moral
theory (2nd ed.). Danvers, MA: University of Notre Dame Press ; for history as narrative White, H.
(1973). Metahistory: The historical imagination in nineteenth-century Europe. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press; for evolution as narrative, see Landau, M. (1984). Human evolution as
narrative. American Scientist, 72, 262–268.
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The Relational Self 89
•
The critic murmurs, “Yes, but these are limitations of language. What
about photographs; if they are not manipulated they constitute irrefutable
pictures of the past?” Yes, photographs do freeze an event in time. However,
every form of representing the past—whether words, photographs, or artifacts—achieves its credibility (or not) by following social conventions. In
this sense photography is a language, and like written language it must
follow certain rules or it does not count as accurate. For example, the
number of ways in which we can photograph a person is virtually unlimited. The photo can be taken from various distances, from different angles,
with various filters, with different sharpness of focus, and so on. What
we call “an accurate depiction” falls within a very narrow range of
possibility.29
29Related is a study of Mary Gergen in which she took photographs every 20 minutes of
whatever was in front of her. When she later displayed the photos to research participants, the
subject matter of most of the photos could not be identified. Cut away from a narrative of
her activities, and not representing “proper” subject matters for photographs, they were largely
beyond recognition. See Gergen, K. J., and Gergen, M. M. ( 1991). Toward reflexive methodologies. In F. Steier (Ed.) Research and refl exivity. London: Sage.
The world does not demand what we take to be our experience of it. Rather, as we
emerge from relationships we come to view the world in specific ways. In effect,
“direct experience” is socially fashioned. Consider the two photos here of the human
face. For most viewers they will seem nonsensical or irrelevant. This is because we do
not participate in a tradition that values this particular way of looking at the face.
Courtesy: Anne Marie Rijsman
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90 RELATIONAL BEING
The critic is piqued: “Are you saying, then, that there are no accurate memories? Is it useless for jury trials to sift through evidence, to call eyewitnesses, to establish the truth about what happened? Are historians just
making up stories? And what about the Holocaust? Don’t your arguments
play into the hands of those who try to deny it ever happened? How can
you possibly take such a position?” This is a very serious criticism, and it is
important to be clear in what I am proposing. As I have emphasized,
through the process of co-action people create stabilized worlds of the real,
the rational, and the good. Within these worlds there can be very rigorous
standards for what counts as accurate. Mathematics is a good case in point.
Here we have a communal achievement par excellence, and within this
community there are definitive rules of accuracy. In this sense, courts of
law can indeed sift the evidence in search for the truth, historians can distinguish between fact and fiction, and we can be certain about the atrocity
of the Holocaust.
However, it is important to recognize that accuracy in these cases is
defined within a particular tradition of relationship. This allows for very
accurate records within a particular tradition. At the same time, we are
invited to consider whose tradition is being honored in any given case.
Whose values carry the day? What voices are absent? It is in this respect
that many minority groups raise questions about standardized histories of
the United States; they feel they are written out of the past. The Holocaust
is an important case in point. It is not that the Holocaust is transcendentally
true—that its evidence is accurate in all possible worlds of interpretation.
However, the existence of this story in its present form is of enormous
consequence to the future of civilization. It is a constant reminder of the
horrific potentials of human beings locked within a reality of superiority
and separation.30 In effect, this story derives its importance largely from its
moral imperatives, and we dare not lose it.
•
Our ways of talking about our experiences work, not primarily to
represent the nature of those experiences in themselves, but to
represent them in such a way as to constitute and sustain one or
another kind of social order.
—John Shotter
•
30For an expansion of this argument, see Gergen, K. J. (2005). Narrative, moral identity, and
historical consciousness: A social constructionist account. In J. Straub (Ed.) Narrative, identity and
historical consciousness. New York: Berghahn.
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The Relational Self 91
Creativity as Relational Achievement
“The man of talent is like the marksman who hits a mark the others cannot
hit; the man of genius is like the marksman who hits a mark they cannot
even see.”31 Thus wrote the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer in 1883. Such
an accolade was not unusual for the late 19th century. This was the period
of high romanticism in which the source of great works was located deep
within the individual mind. One could speak of “inspired” work, or literally, generated by the spirits within. As Frank Barron sees it, this view of
genius carries with it the metaphor of Genesis, or God the creator. Thus,
the praise we accord to creative genius, the sense of awe that we sometimes
experience, is subtly equivalent to an act of worship. In/spiration carries
traces of the Divine.32 This romantic view also finds a home within the
modernist context of the 20th century. More specifically, with its emphasis
on continuous progress, modernist culture grants accolades to creative
innovation. This emphasis is represented in 20th century arts with the concept of the avant-garde.33 The genius is one who breaks with tradition.
Before the 20th century the demand for innovative art was largely
unknown.
As we see, the very idea of a creative act, along with the esteem in
which it is held, is a byproduct of a relational tradition.34 We cannot reveal
“the nature of the creative act” through careful research; indeed, most
research on creativity sustains the very idea of its existence. In this light it
is useful to consider Charles Hampden-Turner’s view that, “We suffer
from stereotyping creativity with ludicrous labels of semi-divinity, mystery,
loneliness, and chaos.”35 Why do we “suffer” from this stereotype? The
answer is largely owing to the tradition of bounded being. Both the romantic and modernist views praise the isolated individual; they treat separation
as essential to inspired work. Thus we emerge today with hierarchies in
which there are the creative geniuses at the top, the weary toilers in the
31Schopenhauer, A. (1886). The world as will and idea. Vol. III. (R. Haldane & J. Kemp,
Trans.) London: Trubner and Ludgate. (Original work published in 1883).
32Barron, F. (1995). No rootless flower: An ecology of creativity. In R. E. Purser and
A. Montuori (Eds.) Social creativity. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
33See, for example, Burger, P. (1984). Theory of the avant-garde. Minneapolis:University of
Minnesota Press; Shattuck, R. (1968). The banquet years: The origins of the avant garde in France.
New York: Vintage.
34A dramatic contrast is furnished by Kabuki theater. Here the demand on the actor is to
replicate the tradition to the best of his ability. Deviations from tradition are scorned.
35Hampden-Turner, C. M. (1999). Control, chaos, control: A cybernetic view of creativity.
In R. E. Purser and A. Montuori, op cit.
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92 RELATIONAL BEING
middle, and then the rabble. We are rendered insensitive to the relational
roots of all that we value as creative.
•
Let us consider these relational roots in more detail. At the outset, there is
the act of judging a work as creative. There is no means of discerning what
goes on “within the mind” of the actor. As proposed, the very idea of a
creative process inside the head is a child of co-action. However, we do
make such judgments, and it is clear that they must find their origins within
a history of relationships. For most of us, if a person spat on his shoe,
hopped over the lines in the pavement, or wore his hat on his shoulder—all
quite original acts—we would scarcely call them creative. They would
simply seem weird. Yet, if Jackson Pollock flings paint at a canvas or John
Cage tears the strings from the piano, the word “creative” is at the tip of
our tongue. This is largely because acts we understand as creative must be
wedded to a tradition of human meaning and practice. Within the tradition of modern painting, Pollock could be considered avant-garde; within
the tradition of modern music, Cage was a genius. Outside these traditions
they too would be simply strange. In effect, one comes into creativity
through participation in a history of relationship.
•
To illustrate the force of tradition on judgments of creativity,
Ilana Breger and I once carried out a study in which we exposed
research participants to a series of abstract paintings.36 Our challenge
to them was to assess the works in terms of their creativity. However,
the participants also learned that some of the paintings took only six
minutes to complete. Others required less than six hours; and still
others, more than six months. As the results demonstrated, paintings
requiring six hours were judged significantly more creative than
either of the others. Apparently, artistic creativity does not burst
suddenly into being, nor require months of toil.
•
“Too many notes, my dear Mozart.”
—Emperor Joseph II
•
36Gergen, K. J., and Breger, I. (1965). Two forms of inference and problems in the assessment
of creativity. Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, 20, 215–216.
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The Relational Self 93
Given that judgments of creativity take place within a social tradition,
we may also conclude that the activity of people we call creative is a performance that gains its reality within a tradition. As recent literary theorists
propose, for example, poets are not free spirits plumbing the depths
of complex thoughts and emotions. Rather, by and large they are participating in a tradition of poetry writing.37 In this tradition there are welldeveloped forms, and standards of what counts as good or bad poetry.
Within the tradition of the avant-garde, poets often try to “break the
mold.” However, whether the poetry is then recognized as creative depends
on considerable negotiation. Poetic invention, then, is an intelligible act
that cannot be removed from the dialogues about poetry in which it is
immersed. In an important sense, poets write for other poets.38
•
Generative ideas emerge from joint thinking, from significant
conversations, and from sustained, shared struggles to achieve new
insights by partners in thought.
—Vera John-Steiner
•
The critic requires a word, “It seems right to point out that creativity is
only recognized within a tradition, but within any tradition there are certain
people who stand out. They tower above their peers in terms of creative
capacity. Just consider the creative talents of James Joyce, T.S. Eliot,
or Pablo Picasso. Don’t they demonstrate the existence of a very special
gift, one that permits the actor to go beyond anything that has yet been
imagined by others?” I certainly share in the admiration for the works of
these individuals. But, putting aside the way heroes in society are marketed
(by art galleries and museums as well), the conclusion that such achievements are beyond relationship is neither necessary nor productive. To view
creativity as a personal inspiration, isolated from others, suggests little
about possible means of fostering the kinds of actions that we might praise
as creative. One is creatively inspired or not, full stop. However, if we see
37See LeFevre, K. B. (1987). Invention as a social act. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois
University Press; also Sawyer, R. K. (2003). Group creativity, music, theater, collaboration. Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.
38In her work, Suzi Gablik argues that modern art has become so self-sufficient, feeding upon
itself, that it has become obscure, losing touch with issues of deeper meaning within the culture
more broadly. See her 2004 work, Has modernism failed (2nd ed.). London: Thames and Hudson;
along with her 1992 volume, The reenchantment of art. London: Thames and Hudson.
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94 RELATIONAL BEING
that creative acts are actions within relationship, then we can ask about the
relational conditions favoring such innovations.
In terms of fostering creativity, it is first useful to consider the conditions
favoring innovation, or “new ideas.” As proposed in Chapter 2, participation
in relationships typically brings about consensus on what is real, rational, and
good. Once consensus is reached (and defended), it is difficult for participants to evacuate. Once swimming in the waters of “the real,” one can
scarcely step outside to view the bowl. Creative innovation is brought to a
standstill. It is in the collision of traditions that innovation is born. Here
unusual juxtapositions, new metaphors, and unsettling integrations are
invited. Within common tradition, a telephone is simply a telephone.
However, if one also participates in the high tech industry, a telephone begins
morphing into a cell phone, a camera, a fashion item, a computer, an entertainment system, and… . As one participates in multiple traditions, creative
acts take wing. It is for this reason that innovation so often occurs outside the
mainstream—at the margins of acceptability.
•
In addition to asking about the conditions favoring creative activity, a relational view also draws attention to the web of relations in which the actor
is enmeshed. As Howard Becker concludes from his study of artists’ lives,
“The artist…works in the center of a network of cooperating people whose
work is essential to the final outcome.”39 Illuminating here are volumes
exploring the fine-tuned interdependence of creative couples. We find
genius is not a product of the individual mind but the relationship.40 The
creative individual often benefits from parents and teachers who, “recognize,
encourage, and affirm a talented young person’s interests and ability. Also,
mentors serve as teachers, sponsors, friends, counselors, and role models.”41
Further, in the arts, the individual often faces loneliness, poverty, and
doubts about his or her ability. This is especially so when iconoclasm is the
signal of creativity. If one is unrecognized, and is breaking the mold, the
risks of rejection are high. The availability of supporting others may be
essential. As Mockros and Csikszentmihalyi see it, “social support systems
39Becker, H. S. (1982). Art worlds. Berkeley: University of California Press. Similar cases have
been made in histories of the great discoveries in the sciences.
40See, for example, John-Steiner, V. (2000). Creative collaboration. New York: Oxford
University Press; Pycior, H. M., Slack, N. G., and Abir-Am, P. G. (Eds.) (1996). Creative couples
in the sciences. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press; Chadwick, W., and de Courtivron, I.
(Eds.) (1996). Significant others: Creativity and intimate partnerships. London: Thames and Hudson;
and Sarnoff, I., and Sarnoff, S. (2002). Intimate creativity: Partners in love and art. Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press.
41John-Steiner, op cit. p. 213.
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The Relational Self 95
and interactions are critical throughout the life span for the emergence of
creativity.”42
•
As we find, rational thought, intentions, experience, memory, and creativity are not prior to relational life, but are born within relationships. They
are not “in the mind,”—separated from the world and from others—but
embodied actions that are fashioned and sustained within relationship.
42Mockros, C. A., and Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1999). The social construction of creative lives.
In A. Montuori and R. E. Purser (Eds.) Social creativity (p. 212). Vol. I. Cresskil, NJ: Hampton
Press.
Gergen, K. J. (2009). Relational being : Beyond self and community. Oxford University Press, Incorporated.
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